



SCIENCE OR STIGMA:  POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE FDA’S 
BAN ON GAY BLOOD 
Dwayne J. Bensing* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a great need for blood in the United States.1  Each year, 
4.5 million Americans will need a blood transfusion.2  The American 
Association of Blood Banks (AABB) estimates that 10.8 million volun-
teers donate blood each year, less than ten percent of the eligible 
donors.3  The great need for blood, coupled with the small pool of 
donors, has resulted in blood shortages that jeopardize the execution 
of medical procedures.4  The blood supply in the United States has 
reached a breaking point.5 
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 1 See, e.g., Blood FAQ, AABB, http://www.aabb.org/resources/bct/Pages/bloodfaq.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“Every day in the U.S., approximately 44,000 units of blood 
are required in hospitals and emergency treatment facilities for patients with cancer and 
other diseases, for organ transplant recipients, and to help save the lives of acci-
dent/trauma victims.  In 2008, more than twenty-three million blood components were 
transfused.  And with an aging population and advances in medical treatments and pro-
cedures requiring blood transfusions, the demand for blood continues to increase.”). 
 2 56 Facts About Blood, AM.’S BLOOD CTRS., http://www.americasblood.org/
go.cfm?do=page.view&pid=12 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 3 See AABB, supra note 1 (stating that “AABB estimates that 10.8 million volunteers donate 
blood each year” and that “less than 10 percent” of the U.S. population “eligible to do-
nate blood at any given time” actually do so). 
 4 See Ishani Ganguli, Blood Shortage Puts Safety Measures in Question, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2007, 
10:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/10/us-usa-health-blood-idUSN
0642622220070910?pageNumber=1 (noting that “American blood banks experienced 
one of their driest summers in history” and that “[i]n Washington’s Georgetown Universi-
ty Hospital, officials came close to canceling nonemergency operations several times this 
summer”). 
 5 See Red Cross Blood Supply Drops to Critically Low Levels, AM. RED CROSS (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e233f6cf911df43181aa0
/?vgnextoid=2b24ae4376d01310VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD (stating that the Ameri-
can Red Cross “issued an appeal for blood donors to roll up a sleeve and address a critical 
shortage across the nation”). 
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FDA regulations require blood collection establishments, such as 
the American Red Cross, to screen potential blood and plasma do-
nors for risk factors related to HIV and other infectious diseases.6  To 
comply with the FDA’s policy, on the date of the donation, blood do-
nation centers are required to assess each prospective donor’s medi-
cal history.7  Generally, a donor must be healthy, be at least 17 years 
old, and weigh at least 110 lbs.8  However, regulations identify certain 
“high-risk” donors that are “deferred.”9  Among the deferred groups 
that may not donate blood, the FDA guidance materials identify men 
who have had sexual contact with other men (“MSM”), even once, 
since 1977, as high-risk.10  These men are given a lifetime deferral.11 
In response to growing pressure from LGBT advocacy groups,12 
political figures,13 and state14 and local governments,15 the U.S. De-
 
 6 See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(b)(6) (2011) (describing FDA qualifications of potential whole 
blood donors); 21 C.F.R. § 640.63(c)(9) (describing FDA qualifications of potential 
plasma donors). 
 7 See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3 (describing FDA requirements for determining the suitability of a 
potential donor of whole blood). 
 8 See Eligibility Requirements, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/donating-
blood/eligibility-requirements (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (describing eligibility require-
ments for blood donors). 
 9 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND 
BLOOD PRODUCTS 2 (1992), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformtion/
OtherRecommendationsforManufactuers/MemorandumtoBloodEstablishments/
UCM062834.pdf (explaining that the “implications for donors who have engaged in cer-
tain high-risk activities” may include a donor being considered “unsuitable,” which may 
result in a “deferral”). 
 10 See id. at 2–3 (including “[m]en who have had sex with another man even one time since 
1977” under the “Criteria for the Exclusion of Unsuitable Donors Who Are at Increased 
Risk for HIV” section). 
 11 See id. at 3 (listing “[m]en who have had sex with another man even one time since 1977” 
as a group that “should not donate blood or blood components”). 
 12 See, e.g., JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI ET AL., GAY MEN’S HEALTH CRISIS, A DRIVE FOR CHANGE:  
REFORMING U.S. BLOOD DONATION POLICIES i–iii (Sean Cahill et. al. eds., 2010), available 
at http://www.gmhc.org/files/editor/file/a_blood_ban_report2010.pdf (providing 
background on the development of the policy and arguing that the ban is outdated). 
 13 See Michelle Garcia, Kerry Calls for Gay Blood Ban Repeal, ADVOCATE.COM (July 26, 2010, 
6:30 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2010/07/26/Kerry_Calls_for_
Gay_Blood_Ban_Repeal/ (describing Senator Kerry’s “effort to get the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration to revise its current policy barring all gay men from donating 
blood”). 
 14 See Dan Aiello, Ending the Federal Ban on Gay Blood Donations, CAL. PROGRESS REP. (Aug. 19, 
2009), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/node/252 (noting that “the As-
sembly Judiciary Committee [in California] passed AJR 13, the U.S. Blood Donor Nondi-
scrimination Resolution,” which “call[ed] upon the nation’s Food and Drug Administra-
tion to end its . . . ban on gay men donating blood to the nation’s blood banks”). 
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partment of Health and Human Services’ Advisory Committee on 
Blood Safety and Availability met on June 11, 2010 to reconsider the 
MSM ban.16 
Despite significant changes in testing since the ban was originally 
implemented,17 the Committee decided to retain the twenty-five year 
old policy that bans blood donation by any man who has had sex with 
a man at any time, even once, since 1977.18  In a 9-6 vote, the Com-
mittee cited a lack of research to support the notion that lifting the 
ban would not contaminate the blood supply.19 
This FDA Policy raises questions of constitutionality and legality 
because it is predicated on assumptions about HIV/AIDS that are not 
based in fact or theory, but based on mere stigma.20  The policy ac-
tually provides a one-two punch:  at the same time as the policy rein-
forces negative stereotypes that gay men are carriers of communica-
 
 15 See ROBERT JACKSON, LEGISLATIVE AND COMMUNITY REPORT 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.council.nyc.gov/d7/html/members/pdf/community_report_04.30.2010.pdf 
(explaining that “the [New York City] Council passed a resolution calling on the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to eliminate its’ [sic] 30 year old prohibition on 
blood donation by gay and bisexual men” because the “ban was based on prejudice, a 
knee-jerk reaction, and misunderstandings about the HIV/AIDS disease” and because 
“[g]iven the constant need for blood, it [did] not make common sense to prohibit dona-
tions from an entire population”); see also Res. 18-486, 2010 Council of D.C (D.C. 2010), 
available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20100607125919.pdf 
(explaining that on June 1, 2010 the Washington, D.C. Council passed a resolution call-
ing on the FDA to “reverse the lifetime deferment of blood donations by men who have 
had sex with men since 1977 in favor of a policy that protects the safety and integrity of 
the blood supply that is based on an up-to-date scientific criteria [sic]”). 
 16 See HHS Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., 1 (June 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/advisorycommittee/
recommendations/06112010_recommendations.pdf (voting on whether “current indefi-
nite deferral for men who have had sex with another man even one time since 1977 
[should] be changed”). 
 17 See Neal Conan, FDA Ban On Blood Donated By Gay Men Upheld, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 
29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128193248 (describ-
ing the improved method of testing blood that scientists have recently developed called 
“nucleic acid testing”). 
 18 See Jacqueline Mroz, Gay Men Condemn Blood Ban as Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at D5 
(describing the reaction of the gay community and others to the FDA’s decision to 
uphold the ban preventing gay men from donating blood). 
 19 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 16, at 1 (summarizing the HHS 
Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability’s decision to continue the “indefi-
nite deferral for men who have had sex with another man even one time since 1977”). 
 20 See Whitney Larkin, Discriminatory Policy:  Denying Gay Men the Opportunity to Donate Blood, 
11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121 (2011) (arguing that the out-dated policy is discrimi-
natory).  But see Adam R. Pulver, Gay Blood Revisionism:  A Critical Analysis of Advocacy and 
the “Gay Blood Ban,” 17 L. & SEXUALITY 107, 127–28 (2008) (arguing that there are legiti-
mate public health justifications for preventing gay men from donating blood). 
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ble diseases just because of their orientation,21 it undermines the 
FDA’s need for potential blood donors by rejecting healthy gay do-
nors.22  The policy also provides false security to high-risk heterosex-
ual donors because it ignores risky heterosexual behaviors, such as 
multiple partners and unprotected sex, which potentially endanger 
one’s health and possibly the blood supply.23 
This Comment will build upon the scholarly work that others have 
started24 to address the various available legal avenues to challenge 
the FDA’s MSM policy.  Part II will briefly discuss the history leading 
to the current FDA Policy and the science that undermines the Advi-
sory Committee’s conclusions.  Part III will address potential constitu-
tional challenges to the FDA Policy and explain how recent Supreme 
Court decisions, and interpretations of those decisions, change the 
legal landscape in favor of repeal.  Part IV provides a roadmap for 
APA challenges to the FDA Policy and explains how these challenges 
differ from constitutional claims, augmenting the available legal ar-
guments against the policy.  Finally, Part V will conclude by exploring 
the ways in which administrative constitutionalism could play a role in 
a successful challenge to the blood ban through the Administrative 
Process. 
 
 21 See SuchIsLifeVideos, Bryan Fischer On Why GOProud Was Disinvited To CPAC 2012, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=
player_embedded&v=qXRrogq-FGg (“Now one of the reasons and I think this is where 
our argument[] [rejecting gays] [is] infallible . . . is the danger that homosexual contact 
imposes to human health . . . . It’s not a lifestyle.  It is a death-style.”). 
 22 See Zachary Roth, Man Says He Was Rejected by Blood Bank for Seeming Gay, YAHOO! NEWS 
(July 18, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/lookout/man-says-rejected-blood-bank-
seeming-gay-151627659.html (“[A] recent study found that the gay ban costs hospitals 
219,000 pints of blood each year.”); see also Naomi G. Goldberg & Gary J. Gates, Effects of 
Lifting the Blood Donation Ban on Men Who Have Sex With Men, 5 PITTSBURGH J. ENVTL. & 
PUB. HEALTH L. 49, 57 (2011) (“If the current MSM ban were completely lifted, we esti-
mate that an additional 130,150 men would likely donate 219,200 additional pints of 
blood each year.”). 
 23 See John G. Culhane, Bad Science, Worse Policy:  The Exclusion of Gay Males from Donor Pools, 
24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2005) (arguing that the blood ban is bad public 
health policy and harms the LGBT community). 
 24 See, e.g., Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the “Men Who Have Sex With Men” 
Blood Donor Exclusion Policy, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 315, 371–73 (2003) (posing equal protection chal-
lenges to the blood ban as applied to “Healthy Gay Men”).  Note that this article was writ-
ten prior to the Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), decision.  See also Luke A. Boso, 
Note, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors:  Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination in 
the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 843, 845–46 (2008) (explaining how the similar FDA ban 
on gay sperm is potentially challengeable under the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
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II.  THE MSM BAN 
In July of 1982, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) 
became the “official name of a mysterious organism that was believed 
to be causing homosexuals, hemophiliacs, Haitians, and intravenous 
drug users to develop a variety of opportunistic infections.”25  Little 
was known about the disease, leaving the medical and LGBT com-
munities utterly confused about an appropriate response.26  The Cen-
ters for Disease Control (“CDC”)27 proposed deferral guidelines—
asking people in high-risk groups such as gay men, Haitians, and 
drug users to refrain from donating blood—at their summer 1982 
meeting.28  However, opposition to the CDC proposal was widespread, 
shared by the National Hemophilia Foundation and the LGBT com-
munity alike.29  It became increasingly clear, though, both in the 
United States and abroad,30 that a response to the threat of AIDS 
within the blood supply was necessary.31  This Part provides the histo-
ry and legal landscape of regulations promulgated for the purposes 
of securing the blood supply, and describes the technological ad-
 
 25 See Belli, supra note 24, at 328 (chronicling “the AIDS crisis in the United States and HIV 
testing methods developed since its advent”). 
 26 See Linda Dorney, Book Note, And The Band Played on Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic, 
3 J. PHARMACY & L. 55, 56 (1994) (reviewing RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON:  
POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1988) (describing the initial confusion within 
the medical community regarding AIDS)). 
 27 See Sherry Glied, Markets Matter:  U.S. Responses to the HIV-Infected Blood Tragedy, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1493, 1495–96 (1996) (“The CDC has no direct regulatory power.  It provides epi-
demiologic information and technical support to other regulatory agencies and informa-
tion to medical providers and the public, but relies on the FDA and other Public Health 
Service agencies to implement its recommendations.  It issued regular surveillance re-
ports and initiated meetings of blood banks, manufacturers, and the FDA during the ear-
ly 1980s, but its recommendations were often ignored in the face of opposition from po-
werful interest groups, especially blood bankers and gay rights activists.”). 
 28 See SHILTS, supra note 26 (describing the CDC’s proposed deferral guidelines). 
 29 See Pulver, supra note 20, at 111 (describing the negative reaction to the CDC proposal). 
 30 See Francine A. Hochberg, HIV/AIDS and Blood Donation Policies:  A Comparative Study of 
Public Health Policies and Individual Rights Norms, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 231, 231–32 
(2002) (comparing the U.S. blood donation policy to five other countries that also ban 
“blood donations by MSM”); see also Rachael Lake, MSM Blood Donation Ban:  (In)Equality, 
Gay Rights and Discrimination Under the Charter, 15 APPEAL 136, 136 (2010) (arguing that 
Canada’s ban on gay blood is discriminatory); Adrian Lomaga, Are Men Who Have Sex With 
Men Safe Blood Donors?, 12 APPEAL 73, 85–88 (2007) (arguing that the Canadian ban on 
gay blood is unconstitutional). 
 31 See Robin Marantz Henig, AIDS:  A New Disease’s Deadly Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1983, at 
SM28 (describing the fear that many felt at the time regarding AIDS contamination in 
the nation’s blood supply and the “intensified” “efforts to find its cause and stop its 
spread”). 
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vancements that now make those policies both unresponsive to the 
goals they originally sought and legally problematic. 
A. History and Legal Landscape 
The U.S. Public Health Service (“PHS”), housed within the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, is responsible for national 
public health.32 
The specific responsibility for developing policies to ensure the 
quality and safety of the blood supply was delegated to the Center for 
Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”)33 under the guidance of 
the FDA.34  The FDA implements policies related to blood and other 
bodily organs, tissues, and fluids; the policies are drafted by the CBER 
through federal regulations.35  The FDA is charged with licensing 
blood banks,36 and is therefore responsible for creating safeguards to 
 
 32 See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 
309, 337 (1997–98) (“The United States Public Health Service, now a part of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, is the federal unit with primary responsibility for 
national public health.”).  The PHS was originally the Marine Hospital Service; it was re-
named in 1912.  Id. at 331–32.  Since that time, the PHS has grown from administering 
health services to marines to administering many of the operative agencies of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), including the CDC, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (“NIH”), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the 
Human Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).  Id. at 337. 
 33 The National Center for Drug and Biologics (“NCDB”) and its Office of Biologics were 
established as part of the FDA in 1982.  See 47 Fed. Reg. 26913, 26913–14, 26919 (June 22, 
1982).  Both were reorganized two years later into the Center for Drugs and Biologics 
(“CDB”) and the Office of Biologics Research and Review, respectively.  See 49 Fed. Reg. 
10168, 10168, 10172–73 (Mar. 19, 1984).  In 1987, the FDA established two centers to re-
place the CDB:  the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”) and the Center 
for Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”).  See 52 Fed. Reg. 38275 (Oct. 15, 1987).  
In 1988, the Office of Biologics Research and Review—under the authority of the 
CBER—became the Office of Biologics Research.  See 53 Fed. Reg. 8978, 8980 (Mar. 18, 
1988).  The Office of Biologics Research is under the umbrella of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and “sends its memoranda out under the HHS 
heading of ‘Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration.’”  Steven R. Salbu, 
AIDS and the Blood Supply:  An Analysis of Law, Regulation, and Public Policy, 74 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 913, 947 n.192 (1996). 
 34 See 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1), 5.10(a)(4) (2004) (delegating to the FDA authority vested in 
the Secretary of DHHS under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–309 (2006)) and under sections 351 and 352 of the Public Health Service Act (re-
levant provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262–263 (2006)). 
 35 Authority vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 361 of the 
Public Health Service Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2006)) includes the law enforce-
ment functions of the FDA.  These functions concern, among other subjects, blood and 
blood products, and have been re-delegated by the Secretary to the Commissioner of 
Food and Drugs.  21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(3).  
 36 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (2006) (requiring processing 
establishments, including blood banks, to register with the FDA); 42 U.S.C. § 262(c) 
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minimize the risk that blood infected with infectious diseases, such as 
AIDS, will make its way into the blood pool.37 
To that end, the FDA has established requirements relating to the 
licensing of blood banks,38 the testing of blood prior to its release,39 
and the eligibility of donors.40  To comply with the FDA’s policy, 
blood donation centers are required to assess each prospective do-
nor’s medical, social, and sexual history on the date of the donation.41  
Although these regulations do not specifically identify MSM donors 
as a high risk group,42 the FDA has issued guidance materials identify-
ing MSM individuals as among the high risk groups that may not do-
nate blood.43 
In the United States, blood donor restrictions have evolved 
through the years.44  In March of 1983, the first non-mandatory guide-
lines were issued45 by the Office of Biologics recommending members 
of groups at “increased risk for AIDS” to refrain from donating plas-
 
(2006) (allowing the FDA to inspect blood or blood product facilities that participate in 
interstate commerce); Snyder v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J. 
1996) (“The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency of the Public Health Ser-
vice (PHS) in the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), in-
spects and licenses blood banks and other blood facilities.”). 
 37 See About the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm (last modified Sept. 30, 2011) (explaining how 
CBER’s responsibilities in this regard derive from the Public Health Service Act and from 
specific sections of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
 38 See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (establishing licensure requirements for biological products 
introduced into interstate commerce); 21 C.F.R. § 606.100 (2010) (outlining standard 
operating procedures for collecting, processing, testing, storing, and distributing blood 
and blood components for transfusion and manufacturing purposes). 
 39 See 21 C.F.R. § 610.40 (2010) (requiring blood collection establishments to test blood do-
nations for evidence of infection at the time of collection); 21 C.F.R. § 640.5 (requiring 
lab tests of blood specimens to occur at the time of donation). 
 40 See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.50 (2011) (requiring donors to be “free from risk factors for, and 
clinical evidence of, infection”). 
 41 See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(a) (2010) (requiring that blood donation centers assess each pros-
pective donor’s medical history). 
 42 See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(b)–(f) (listing factors that disqualify individuals for whole blood do-
nation); 21 C.F.R. § 640.63(c) (listing factors that disqualify individuals for plasma dona-
tion). 
 43 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9, at 3 (indicating that MSM 
should refrain from donating blood or blood components). 
 44 Salbu, supra note 33, at 947 (describing the evolution of blood restrictions). 
 45 Memorandum from John C. Petricciani, M.D., Dir., Office of Biologics, Nat’l Ctr. for 
Drugs & Biologics, FDA, to All Establishments Collecting Human Blood for Transfusion, 
Recommendations to Decrease the Risk of Transmitting Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) from Blood Donors 1 (Mar. 24, 1983), in HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY:  
AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISIONMAKING 290–91 (Lauren B. Leveton et al. eds., 1995). 
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ma or blood.46  At that time, however, the guidelines only included 
gays who were either currently sexually active with multiple partners, 
had “overt symptoms of immune deficiency,” or had previously en-
gaged in sexual relations with people who now exhibited such symp-
toms.47  Blood collection agencies were also asked to provide educa-
tional materials on AIDS to donors, and to educate staff about 
identifying early signs or symptoms of AIDS in potential donors.48  
Furthermore, physicians were encouraged to provide transfusions on-
ly when “medically necessary.”49 
Between 1984 and 1996, the Office of Biologics issued biannual 
revisions of the exclusion categories originally set forth in the 1983 
Memorandum.50  For the purposes of this Comment, the most signifi-
cant changes occurred in 1986, when the policy began excluding 
men who have had sex with another man one or more times since 
197751 (amending the 1984 language excluding males who have had 
sex with more than one male since 1979)52 and in 1992, when the policy 
included language recommending a lifetime deferral for MSM.53 
B. Technological Advancements 
Since the ban on MSM blood was first instituted in 1983, there 
have been several significant technological advancements in the test-
ing of blood for HIV that make more accurate and targeted screening 
possible.  Beginning in 1985, blood banks initiated universal testing 
of blood donations.54  The FDA’s first test, an enzyme-linked immu-
 
 46 RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES:  AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH 85 (1989). 
 47 SHILTS, supra note 28, at 242. 
 48 Robert K. Jenner, Chronology of AIDS, in TRANSFUSION-ASSOCIATED AIDS 22 (Robert K. 
Jenner ed., 1995). 
 49 Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50 Belli, supra note 24, at 339. 
 51 Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, M.D., Dir., Office of Biologics Research & Review 
(“OBRR”), Ctr. for Drugs & Biologics, FDA, to All Registered Blood Establishments, Addi-
tional Recommendations for Reducing Further the Number of Units of Blood and Plas-
ma Donated for Transfusion or for Further Manufacture by Persons at Increased Risk of 
HTLV-III/LAV Infection 1–2 (Oct. 30, 1986). 
 52 Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, M.D., Acting Dir., Office of Biologics Research & 
Review, Ctr. for Drugs & Biologics, to All Establishments Collecting Blood for Transfusion 
and All Source Plasma (Human) Establishments, Plasma Derived from Therapeutic Plas-
ma Exchange (Dec. 14, 1984). 
 53 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9, at 3. 
 54 Hochberg, supra note 30, at 246; see also Blood Testing, AM. RED CROSS, 
http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-about-blood/what-happens-donated-blood/blood-
testing (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (describing the blood tests performed by the Red 
Cross). 
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nosorbent assay test (the “ELISA test”), was approved in 1985 and de-
tected human antibody produced in response to exposure to HIV.55  
Because the ELISA test had a high rate of false positives (safe blood 
testing positive for HIV), the FDA approved the first confirmatory 
test, the Western Blot, in 1987.56  In combination, the ELISA and the 
Western Blot tests are considered to be 100% effective for detecting 
HIV antibodies.57  However, there is a latency period of up to several 
months in which a person infected with HIV has not yet developed 
the antibodies detected by these tests.58  Since 2002, however, the rou-
tine use of nucleic acid testing (“NAT”) for the HIV virus itself (ra-
ther than its antibodies) has further reduced the risk of transfusion 
transmission of HIV to about one unit per two million donations.59  
Typically, the test will detect the presence of HIV within nine to ele-
ven days of infection, providing a window period significantly shorter 
than the more common antibody test.60 
These technological advancements have called into question the 
validity of lifetime deferral policies of MSM blood, both within the 
United States and abroad.61  Despite these advancements, however, 
the Blood Products Advisory Committee (“BPAC”)62 has refused to 
 
 55 Belli, supra note 24, at 332–33. 
 56 Id. at 334–35. 
 57 Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 58 See Belli, supra note 24, at 336. 
 59 See Blood Testing, supra note 54 (describing the blood tests performed by the Red Cross); 
see also Christopher D. Pilcher et al., Acute HIV Revisited:  New Opportunities for Treatment 
and Prevention, 113 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 937, 937 (2004), available at 
http://www.jci.org/cgi/reprint/113/7/937.pdf.  Nonetheless, “[w]hile HIV nucleic acid 
amplification assays are now extremely sensitive and can reliably detect HIV by days 9–11 
of infection . . . , they are vulnerable to false-positive rates as high as 1%.  Such tests re-
main relatively expensive and have not traditionally been used for routine clinical HIV 
screening.”  Id.  The Red Cross tests “minipools” of sixteen units using NAT.  Blood Test-
ing, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-about-blood/what-happens-
donated-blood/blood-testing (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
 60 HIV Testing Basics for Consumers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/testing/resources/qa/be_tested.htm (last modified Apr. 
9, 2010). 
 61 See James Gallagher, Gay Men Blood Donor Ban to be Lifted, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-14824310 (discussing the lifting of the lifetime ban 
on blood donations of gay men in England, Scotland and Wales); Joanna Smith, Blood 
Donor Agency Wants Lifetime Ban Lifted for Gay Men, THESTAR.COM (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/928904--blood-donor-agency-wants-
lifetime-ban-lifted-for-gay-men (discussing the Canadian Blood Services change in posi-
tion to opposing the lifetime deferral). 
 62 BPAC, a standing advisory committee to the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research (“CBER”), is charged with “review[ing] and evaluat[ing] data concerning the 
safety, effectiveness, and appropriate use of blood, products . . . intended for use in the 
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of human diseases.”  Charter of the Blood Products Advi-
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change the MSM policy.  The committee voted down any changes, in-
cluding a comparable twelve month deferral used for other high-risk 
groups for MSM, when advocates pressed for review of the policy in 
both 200063 and 2006.64  An important difference between the 2000 
and 2006 calls for repeal was that the Red Cross, which supplies more 
than forty percent of the nation’s blood supply,65 changed its position 
in favor of repealing the lifetime deferral policy.66  Finally, in the 
summer of 2010, the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Avail-
ability67 also refused to change the policy.68  This most recent decision 
has reignited the debate and sparked protests from gay advocates69 
and scientists70 that the policy is discriminatory and outdated. 
 
sory Committee, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/
BloodProductsAdvisoryCommittee/ucm121602.htm (last modified May 21, 2010).  
Among other things, BPAC advises the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (the “FDA 
Commissioner”) “of its findings regarding the safety, effectiveness, screening and testing 
(to determine eligibility) of donors . . . and on the quality and relevance of FDA’s re-
search program which provides the scientific support for regulating [blood products].”  
Id. 
 63 FDA, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, BLOOD PRODS. ADVISORY COMM. 67TH MEETING 201–
02 (Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/cber00.
htm#Blood%20Prducts (follow links for 9/14 and 9/15 transcripts under “Blood Prod-
ucts Advisory Committee” heading) (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 64 FDA, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, BLOOD PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 86TH 
MEETING 60–61 (Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/
transcripts/2006-4206t1.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 65 Blood Facts and Statistics, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-about-
blood/blood-facts-and-statistics (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
 66 See HHS Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability Meets, AM. RED CROSS (June 11, 
2010), http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.1a019a978f421296e81ec89e
43181aa0/?vgnextoid=fee99570ba229210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD (recommend-
ing that the FDA “amend the indefinite deferral currently in place for a male who has 
had sex with another male since 177 to a 12-month deferral”); see also Rob Stein, FDA To 
Review Ban on Gay Men Donating Blood, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at A06 (discussing the 
collective recommendation by the American Red Cross, American Association of Blood 
Banks, and America’s Blood Centers to change the FDA policy permanently barring male 
blood donors who have had sex with another man as of 1977; the group argues that “cur-
rent tests and screening methods have improved enough to protect transfusion recipients 
without the lifetime ban”). 
 67 The Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability was formed to find ways to en-
courage regular blood donors to donate blood more often than their average 1.5 times 
per year.  Charter of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/
advisorycommittee/index.html. 
 68 See Caption Notes for Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability Day 2, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 11, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/
advisorycommittee/pastmeetings/pastmeetings.html#jun10. 
 69 See Mroz, supra note 18; Gay Rights Petition to the FDA:  Stop Preventing Gay Men from Donat-
ing Blood, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/fda-stop-preventing-gay-men-
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III.  A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE:  POST-LAWRENCE 
The FDA blood policy treats gay men differently than similarly si-
tuated straight donors, thereby raising constitutional equal protec-
tion concerns.  This Part expands upon arguments made by Michael 
Christian Belli in 200371 that the MSM ban is unconstitutional.72  Since 
Belli’s paper was written before Lawrence v. Texas,73 as well as other re-
levant cases concerning gay rights, it is timely to readdress the issue of 
whether the MSM ban would withstand a constitutional challenge 
within today’s jurisprudence.  For the purposes of this Comment, ra-
ther than merely repeating the constitutional problems posed by the 
MSM policy, I focus on the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection ar-
guments in a post-Lawrence world.  Primarily, I address the level of 
scrutiny to which the ban might be subjected.74 
Although Belli’s article employs the rational basis review test when 
evaluating the Equal Protection Clause challenges to the MSM poli-
cy,75 after Lawrence, one could argue that a stricter standard is appro-
priate when reviewing policies directed toward gays, and would there-
fore be appropriate when challenging the MSM policy.76  The 
appropriate level of review employed by the judiciary depends upon a 
number of factors, such as (1) the class involved, (2) the particular 
rights infringed upon, (3) a history of unequal treatment, and (4) 
other variously weighted factors.77  Belli bases his analysis upon the 
 
from-donating-blood (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (calling on members to sign a petition 
asking the FDA to stop discriminating against gay men). 
 70 See, e.g., Conan, supra note 17. 
 71 Belli, supra note 24, at 362–75. 
 72 A similar argument was recently made in Canada, and failed.  See Joe Fantauzzi, Thornhill 
Gay Advocates Cry Foul Over Blood Ban Ruling, AURORA BANNER (Ontario), Sept. 10, 2010, at 
1 (discussing the Superior Court of Ontario's decision to uphold a ban on blood dona-
tions by gay men despite the plaintiff's argument that such a ban is unconstitutional). 
 73 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–76 (2003) (discussing the link between equal pro-
tection and due process with respect to homosexual conduct, posing that to criminalize 
homosexual acts invites “subject[ing] homosexual persons to discrimination”). 
 74 This Comment assumes success on technical issues, such as standing.  For a discussion 
about stigma satisfying standing requirements, see Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and 
Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 488 (2007) (“[W]hen the government does stigmatize a 
group, members of that group should have standing to argue that the government’s ac-
tion is unlawful.”). 
 75 Belli, supra note 24, at 347–51 (delineating the necessary elements to assert an Equal Pro-
tection claim, noting that countervailing factors relating to a legitimate state interest may 
dictate sustaining the challenged classification). 
 76 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664–86 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing 
whether sexual orientation is a suspect class). 
 77 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985).  Statutes that 
classify on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, and laws that “impinge on per-
sonal rights protected by the Constitution,” are subjected to the highest standard of re-
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fact that the Court in Romer v. Evans78 used rational basis review.  This 
Part, however, examines the possibility of strict scrutiny review and 
the MSM policy’s viability when held to that standard. 
Although the Lawrence majority decision was based in terms of due 
process, often due process claims are linked to equal protection 
claims.79  The Court in Lawrence said “[e]quality of treatment and the 
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and 
a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”80  Concurring 
in the decision, Justice O’Connor explicitly based her opinion on 
equal protection grounds, instead of due process, explaining, 
“[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the 
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”81  The Court’s decision indicated 
that the Texas sodomy law was a violation of the law because it tar-
geted gay men, similar to the way that the MSM ban targets gay men. 
Lawrence was a game changing decision for the recognition of 
LGBT legal rights.  In Lawrence, the Court departed from traditional 
rational basis review without committing to a higher level of scruti-
ny.82  While Justices Kennedy and O’Connor claim to be applying ra-
 
view, strict scrutiny.  Id. at 440.  Such “will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.”  Id.  Legislative classifications based on gender or illegi-
timacy are also subject to a heightened level of review and will fail if, in the case of a 
gender, the classification is not “substantially related to a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest,” or in the case of illegitimacy, the classification is not “substantially re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.”  Id. at 441.  All other classifications will be sustained if 
they pass the minimum standard of review, rational basis.  Id. at 441–42. 
 78 517 U.S. 620, 631–33 (1996) (requiring rational basis review as the level of scrutiny for a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection matter concerning sexual orientation). 
 79 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“[D]ue process and equal protection, far 
from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly inter-
locked in a legal double helix.”). 
 80 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does 
so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were 
not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.  When homosexual conduct is 
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to 
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private 
spheres.  The central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it 
should be addressed.  Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual per-
sons.”). 
 81 Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 82 See Kristina Brittenham, Note, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High School:  Why 
Anti-Subordination Alone is Not Enough, 45 B.C. L. REV. 869, 889 (2004) (“In two relatively 
recent cases, Romer v. Evans, in 1996, and Lawrence v. Texas, in 2003, the Court suggested a 
move towards applying a heightened level of scrutiny when sexual orientation is a basis 
for discrimination.”). 
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tional basis, they required more than the typical nominal justification 
of the anti-gay legislation when applying that review.83  Anti-gay sta-
tutes now meet resistance in passing the rational basis review scrutiny, 
as can be seen in cases decided by lower courts on DOMA,84 Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell,85 gay marriage,86 and federal same-sex benefits.87  Even 
state courts have looked to the Lawrence decision as an indicator of 
heightened scrutiny in dealing with anti-gay policies.88  Indeed, post-
Lawrence jurisprudence, at the least, must look more critically upon 
anti-gay policies. 
On the other hand, the Court explicitly claims to be applying ra-
tional basis review in Lawrence, does not employ equal protection 
analysis,89 and has failed to increase the level of scrutiny with which to 
evaluate policies discriminating against gays.90  Furthermore, cases 
 
 83 See Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve:  Will The New Supreme Court Grant Gays 
the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 295–96 (2006) (discussing 
Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor’s opinions in Lawrence v. Texas). 
 84 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 n.114 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Law-
rence for the proposition “that the government cannot justify discrimination against same-
sex couples based on traditional notions of morality alone”).  The court therefore held 
Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to the plaintiffs, “violates the equal protection principles 
embodied in the Fifth Amendment” as “irrational prejudice plainly never constitutes a le-
gitimate government interest.”  Id. at 397. 
 85 Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 911 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing 
Lawrence in ruling that “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell constitutes an intrusion upon the personal 
and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights identified in Law-
rence, and is subject to heightened scrutiny” (internal citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 86 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (ruling that Proposi-
tion 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause in excluding same-sex couples from marriage 
and was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and citing Lawrence as holding 
“homosexual conduct and attraction are constitutionally protected and integral parts of 
what makes someone gay or lesbian”).  
 87 In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Because there is no rational basis for 
denying benefits to the same-sex spouses of [Office of Federal Public Defender] em-
ployees . . . the application of DOMA to the [Federal Employee Health Benefits Act] so as 
to reach that result is unconstitutional.”). 
 88 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 953, 959 (Mass. 2003) (citing 
Lawrence as support in declaring the Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage unconstitu-
tional on state constitutional grounds). 
 89 Justin Reinheimer, What Lawrence Should Have Said:  Reconstructing an Equality Approach, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 505, 515 (2008) (“Notably, the Court declined to invalidate the statute 
on equal protection grounds, although certiorari was granted on whether the Texas sta-
tute violated the Equal Protection Clause, and equality arguments were made during liti-
gation.”).  But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that “the basis for 
declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause . . . is a tenable ar-
gument” (emphasis added)). 
 90 Arthur S. Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
189, 200 (2004) (“The Romer opinion never directly discussed whether sexual orientation 
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post-Lawrence, including decisions on adoption91 and same sex mar-
riage,92 have failed to use a heightened level of scrutiny.  Regardless, 
when addressing anti-gay policies, courts will inevitably be called 
upon to decide how Lawrence factors into the analysis. 
Importantly, President Obama has recently embraced strict scru-
tiny of statutes aimed toward LGBT people.  Indeed, “the President 
has concluded that given a number of factors, including a docu-
mented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual 
orientation should be subject to a more heightened standard of scru-
tiny.”93  Although the President’s view may not be immediately em-
braced or followed by the Court, it is important support for the posi-
tion that laws and policies targeting gays should be evaluated under 
strict scrutiny, and indicates a shift in the legal analysis of policies and 
statutes directed toward LGBT people.  It also supports the scrutiny 
with which the executive agencies, including the FDA, should review 
its own policies.  Therefore, following the President’s order, the FDA, 
and the courts, should strictly scrutinize the MSM ban. 
The MSM ban fails a heightened level of rational basis review.  
Even though the law applies only to conduct (men who have had sex 
with men), “the conduct targeted . . . is conduct that is closely corre-
 
discrimination claims would merit heightened scrutiny, or how such claims would fall 
along the equal protection scale between suspect and non-suspect classifications.”). 
 91 Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–17, 826 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that neither Romer nor Lawrence requires that the court use heigh-
tened scrutiny to strike down the Florida statute banning same-sex adoption). 
 92 Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he level of 
judicial scrutiny to be applied in determining the validity of state legislative and constitu-
tional enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment is a subject of continuing debate 
and disagreement among the Justices.  Though the most relevant precedents are murky 
we conclude . . . [the Oklahoma ban on same-sex marriage] should receive rational-basis 
review under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a heightened level of judicial scru-
tiny.”); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 570 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2010) (“In Lawrence, the 
court expressly declined to extend its holding to governmental recognition or sanction-
ing of homosexual marriages.  Therefore, under the current state of the law, we find that 
the right of consenting adults to engage in intimate conduct, without governmental inter-
ference, does not involve or guarantee the right to require a government to grant the 
parties a marriage.” (citation omitted)); In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674 (Tex. App. 2010) 
(“We conclude that homosexuals are not a suspect class, that persons who choose to mar-
ry persons of the same sex are not a suspect class, and that the Texas law [limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples] . . . does not discriminate against a suspect class.”).  But see 
Mary M. Kellerman, Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning:  Why the Eighth Circuit 
Wrongly Upheld Nebraska’s § 29 in the Face of an Equal Protection Challenge, 30 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 373, 407 (2007) (noting that Section 29 “fails even the lenient rational basis analy-
sis”). 
 93 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of the Attorney General 
on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html. 
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lated with being homosexual.  Under such circumstances . . . [i]t is 
instead directed toward gay persons as a class.”94  While not targeting 
“gay men,” but only “men who have sex with men,” the policy creates 
a distinction without legal meaning.  “After all, there can hardly be 
more palpable discrimination against a class than making the con-
duct that defines the class criminal.”95  The MSM ban targets all gay 
men, even those who have no chance of an HIV infection.  There is 
no sexually active gay man that could pass the ban’s exclusion of a 
man who has had sex with a man since 1977. 
As explained above, making broad, meritless, class distinctions 
that exclude an unpopular group for the sole purpose of excluding 
that group is unconstitutional.  The Court held in Lawrence that when 
the state makes conduct that defines a class as criminal, “that declara-
tion in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”96  The 
blood ban is distinguished in that it does not make MSM acts crimi-
nal.  However, under the blanket ban, one is presumed guilty of risky 
behavior and communicable disease simply by being gay.97 
The assumption inherent within the MSM policy is that all gay 
men are risky donors, enshrining the stigma of gay men in official 
government agency policy.  This stigmatization is directed to gay men 
and everyone else:  the ban on MSM blood sends the message to gay 
men that they are, by nature, automatically involved in risky sexual 
activities.  This message undermines education to gay men about ac-
tivities that decrease the likelihood of obtaining a sexually transmit-
ted disease, such as engaging in protected sexual activity and main-
taining monogamous, trusting relationships.  The ban also supports 
other’s stigmatization of gay men in infusing the idea that being gay 
includes having HIV/AIDS.  This stigmatization undermines efforts 
to decrease the spread of disease and works to disadvantage gay 
men.98  To be clear, a person does not get HIV because he is gay, nor 
 
 94 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 97 SuchIsLifeVideos, supra note 21 (“[The FDA] cannot afford to play Russian Roulette with 
the nation’s blood supply . . . . Now notice, [the MSM ban] does not have anything to do 
with bigotry [or] hatred.  This is purely a matter of science, biology, and human 
health . . . .”). 
 98 See Deborah L. Brimlow, Jennifer S. Cook & Richard Seaton, Stigma and HIV/AIDS:  A 
Review of the Literature 3 (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://test.stigmaactionnetwork.org/atomicDocuments/SANDocuments/201103301649
04-HRSA_2003_Stigma%20and%20HIV-AIDS%20-%20A%20Review%20of%20the%20
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does a person get HIV by having sex with a man.  A person is at risk 
of being infected with HIV if infected body fluids enter that person’s 
body,99 whether or not that person is gay, and whether or not that 
person is a man. 
Defenders of the policy argue its merits, which range from high-
lighting the risk of MSM blood to the deficiencies in current testing 
for trasmittable infections.  These defenders argue that the MSM pol-
icy is rational under the “precautionary principle.”100  The FDA de-
fends the policy by stating the high HIV prevalence (and other infec-
tions) in MSM men.101  Because blood donor testing does not yet 
detect all infected donors, the argument goes, undetected infected 
donors would slip through the cracks if the ban were lifted. 102  The 
FDA also argues that the MSM policy reduces the likelihood that a 
person would unknowingly donate blood during the “window period” 
of infection.103  Furthermore, they argue that excluding MSM de-
creases risk of blood accidentally given to a patient in error either be-
fore testing is completed or following a positive test.104  Lastly, the 
FDA claims that there is no alternate set of donor eligibility criteria 
found to reliably identify MSM who are not at increased risk for HIV 
or certain other transfusion transmissible infections.105 
The defenses articulated by the FDA do not withstand scrutiny.  
Without exploring the weaknesses of the precautionary principle it-
 
Literature.pdf (noting that “[s]tigma against HIV/AIDS is often related to the stigma of 
homosexuality”). 
 99 See How Do You Get HIV or AIDS?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://aids.gov/hiv-
aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/overview/how-you-get-hiv-aids/ (last revised June 20, 2011); see 
also NAT’L CTR. FOR HIV/AIDS, VIRAL HEPATITIS, STD & TB PREVENTION, HIV AND AIDS:  
ARE YOU AT RISK? (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/brochures/at-
risk.htm (listing ways a person may get HIV, all of which include activity with “someone 
with HIV infection”). 
100 Pulver, supra note 20, at 127–28 (“The precautionary principle encourages policymakers 
to take the most cautious, risk-averse option whenever an activity potentially threatens 
harm to human health.”). 
101 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HIV/AIDS, HEPATITIS, STD, AND TB PREVENTION, HIV AMONG GAY, 
BISEXUAL AND OTHER MEN WHO HAVE SEX WITH MEN (MSM) (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/msm/index.htm (noting that gay, bisexual, and other 
MSM account for over half of all new HIV infections in the United States in 2006). 
102 Blood Donations from Men Who Have Sex with Other Men Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (June 18, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/
bloodbloodproducts/questionsaboutblood/ucm108186.htm (explaining the rationale 
and parameters defining the FDA’s MSM policy). 
103   Id. 
104   Id. 
105 Id. 
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self,106 the MSM policy fails to rationally apply that principle.  The 
most cautious, risk-averse option would be to ban blood from all high 
risk groups, including heterosexual donors who engage in unpro-
tected, multiple-partner, sex.  The high HIV prevalence in MSM ig-
nores the high prevalence in other groups (or subgroups, such as 
young, black MSM107), such as African American females,108 and does 
not serve as a justifiable distinction. 
That blood donor testing does not yet detect all infected donors 
or that donors may give during the “window period” applies equally 
to all donors, with no higher risk posed by MSM.  Similarly, the risk of 
blood accidentally given to a patient in error either before testing, is 
completed or following a positive test is always present, regardless of 
whom the donors are.  Alternate donor eligibility criteria could target 
behaviors that make potential donors an increased risk for HIV or 
certain other transfusion transmissible infections and have been ex-
tensively researched and suggested.109  While the MSM ban serves as a 
broad exclusion with the purpose of protecting the blood supply, it 
does so by being both over-inclusive in excluding healthy gay donors, 
and under-inclusive in admitting risky non-gay donors. 
By singling out one group, gay men, the policy is facially discrimi-
natory; moreover, it is not rationally related to its stated goal of pro-
tecting the donor pools, insofar as it does not apply to other high-risk 
groups.  A ban that discriminates against a marginalized group with-
out meritorious justification violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment and should be deemed unconstitutional. 
IV.  AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT CHALLENGE 
Not only is the MSM ban unconstitutional, it is also illegal by vi-
olating the protections ensured by the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”).  Because the FDA is an Administrative Agency, the APA go-
 
106 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003) (dis-
cussing why the precautionary principle should be rejected). 
107 See Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, & TB Prevention, New 
Multi-Year Data Show Annual HIV Infections in United States Relatively Stable (Aug. 3, 
2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/HIVIncidencePressRelease
.html (“[B]lack MSM were the only group to experience a statistically significant increase 
in new infections over the four-year time period studied.”). 
108 See Minority Women's Health, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV (May 18, 2010), 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/minority/africanamerican/hiv.cfm (“[W]omen account 
for more than 1 in 4 new HIV/AIDS cases in the United States.  Of these newly infected 
women, about 2 in 3 are African-American.”). 
109 See WARDENSKI ET AL., supra note 12. 
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verns it and its actions are reviewable by the courts.110  Under the 
APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning 
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”111  Once a 
court finds that the agency’s action is final, it may then consider six 
factors to determine whether that action is unlawful:  (1) is it arbi-
trary or capricious; (2) is it unconstitutional; (3) is it outside of the 
agency’s jurisdiction; (4) did the agency fail to follow statutory pro-
cedures; (5) is it unsupported by substantial evidence; or (6) is it un-
warranted by the facts?112  Therefore, it is possible that a gay donor 
could bring suit under the APA challenging the MSM policy. 
An APA challenge is potentially even more advantageous here be-
cause it allows avenues for a court to rule that the MSM policy is illeg-
al, without ruling on its constitutionality.113  Similar arguments have 
been made about potential challenges of the FDA’s ban on gay 
sperm.114  Like the MSM ban, the FDA also categorically excludes men 
who have had sex with men from sperm donor pools.115  Rather than 
repeat those arguments here, this Part demonstrates how an APA 
challenge is similarly applicable to the MSM ban.  This Part outlines 
the necessary components to an APA challenge, and discusses the 
possible drawbacks of this approach.  Although other potential APA 
challenges are available, this Comment focuses on the claim that the 
FDA’s MSM ban is arbitrary and capricious. 
The first question in an APA challenge is whether the agency deci-
sion constitutes “final action.”116  The FDA’s action here is through 
 
110 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–50 (1967) (discussing when agency action 
is judicially reviewable). 
111 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
112 Id. § 706. 
113 See Carmel Shachar, Administrative Law v. Constitutional Law:  The Correct Decision on FDA's 
Treatment of Plan B, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 523, 526 (2009) (explaining that APA chal-
lenges to Plan B regulations were more persuasive than Constitutional challenges); see al-
so Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling based on APA 
challenge to FDA’s course of conduct regarding the emergency contraceptive rather than 
constitutional challenge). 
114 See Boso, supra note 24, at 853 (explaining how the similar FDA ban on gay sperm is po-
tentially challengeable under the APA); see also Letter from John Givner, Staff Attorney, 
Lambda Legal, to Div. of Dockets Mgm’t, Food & Drug Admin. 1, 3–4 & 4 n.4 (Aug. 23, 
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dailys/04/aug04/
083004/04d-0193-c00017-vol1.pdf (arguing that the ban on sperm donation is arbitrary 
and capricious). 
115 See Letter from John Givner, supra note 114, at 3–4 & 4 n.4. 
116 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992) (“[T]o determine when an agency 
action is final, [the Court] ha[s] looked to, among other things, whether its impact is suf-
ficiently direct and immediate and has a direct effect on . . . day-to-day business.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
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guidance documents, stating that MSM constitutes “high risk.”117  
“Guidance documents do not themselves establish legally enforceable 
rights or responsibilities and are not legally binding on the public or 
the agency.”118  However, the courts have ruled that a guidance may 
amount to a final rule when its impact “is sufficiently direct and im-
mediate and has a direct effect on . . . day-to-day business.”119  Because 
the guidance materials here are final to the same extent that guid-
ance documents banning gay sperm are final, namely that gay men 
are prohibited from donating in either sphere, those arguments 
equally apply here.120 
An obstacle in an APA challenge to the MSM blood ban is that the 
FDA is following the opinion of an advisory committee, rather than 
making the arbitrary conclusions itself.  Congress enacted the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act in 1972 to control the growth and ensure the 
open operation of the “numerous committees, boards, commissions, 
councils, and similar groups which have been established to advise of-
ficers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment.”121  To achieve these objectives, the FACA places a number of 
procedural restrictions on those bodies that constitute “advisory 
committees.”122  Although courts have held that Congress did not in-
 
117 See Eligibility Requirements, supra note 8. 
118 The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Doc-
uments, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (1997). 
119 Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797; see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021–24 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing when agency action constitutes final action); Todd D. Rakoff, 
The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
159, 167 (2000) (discussing the legal effect of guidelines generated without promulgating 
a “nominally-legally-binding regulation”). 
120 See Boso supra note 24, at 854–58 (“[T]he FDA’s recommendations have a direct and im-
mediate impact on the . . . industry, and second, the industry relies on those recommen-
dations.”). 
121 See Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 2(a), 86 Stat. 770, 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2(a) 
(2006)) (defining an advisory committee as “any committee, board, commission, council, 
conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other sub-
group thereof” that is “established or utilized” by the President or an agency “in the in-
terest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies 
or officers of the Federal Government”); see also Grigsby Brandford & Co. v. United 
States, 869 F. Supp. 984, 1001 (D.D.C. 1994) (defining an Advisory Committee as “any 
committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar 
group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof, which is established . . . for the 
purpose of obtaining advice or recommendations on issues or policies which are within the scope 
of his or her responsibilities” (internal quotations omitted)).  See generally Pub. Citizen v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 438, 466 (1989) (finding that public interest groups had 
standing to bring suit under FACA). 
122 See NRDC v. Abraham, 223 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175 (D.D.C. 2002) (explaining the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act). 
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tend for FACA to be enforced through a private right of action,123 
plaintiffs are nevertheless entitled to enforce FACA’s substantive re-
quirements through the judicial review provisions of the APA.124  The 
APA and constitutional requirements of the FDA, however, are not 
shielded from challenge by the FACA, because reliance on an advi-
sory committee’s decision may constitute final agency action.125  
Therefore, that an advisory committee produces the guidelines does 
not protect the FDA’s promulgation of an arbitrary and capricious 
policy from an APA challenge. 
To determine the scope of review for the FDA’s final decision 
banning MSM blood, a court must determine whether the decision 
was reached through formal or informal rulemaking.126  As outlined 
above,127 the FDA solicited comments regarding its guidance docu-
ments rather than following the formal procedures of formal rule-
making, and, therefore, its decision regarding MSM blood would 
probably be reviewed within a similar framework as an informal 
rulemaking.128  The court explained in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe that in reviewing informal rulemaking, 
[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a consid-
eration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error 
 
123 See, e.g., Int’l Brominated Solvents Ass’n v. Am. Conf. of Governmental Indus. Hygienists, 
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (citing awareness of only two decisions 
in which FACA has been considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander 
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that there is no implied private right of ac-
tion without basis in statutory text).  “In each case, the result was the same:  Congress did 
not intend for FACA to be permit a private right of action.”  Int’l Brominated Solvents Ass’n, 
393 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. 
124 See id. at 1320 (“Although Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action that arises under FACA, 
they are nevertheless entitled to enforce FACA’s substantive requirements through the 
judicial review provisions of the APA.”). 
125 See id. at 1381 (noting that reliance on an advisory committee’s recommendation could 
be considered to meet the Supreme Court’s definition of “action” because it is one 
“manner in which an agency may exercise its power. . . . Moreover, it can be considered 
final for purposes of the APA because using . . . [those recommendations] represents the 
consummation of . . . [the advisory committee’s] decision-making process and imposes 
certain obligations from which legal consequences flow.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
126 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414–15 (1971) (stating that 
“[r]eview under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is 
taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself,” and 
that de novo review of whether the action was “unwarranted by the facts” is authorized 
only when the action is adjudicatory in nature (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
127 See supra notes 59–60, 62. 
128 See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 159 (2007) (“In the case of informal rulemaking 
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must give interested persons 
an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process through submission of written 
data, views, or arguments with or without the opportunity for an oral presentation.”). 
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of judgment. . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching 
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.  The court is 
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.129 
This review is analogous to the limited rational basis review.130  The 
review is furthermore limited by the fact that the agency’s decision is 
science-based.131  Because agencies are deemed experts of highly 
technical issues, courts are not viewed as the proper venue for most 
policy decisions.  However, if the court finds that an agency action is 
arbitrary and capricious, the action is set aside.132 
Courts generally give informal agency action a high degree of de-
ference; that deference, however, is not a rubber stamp.  In some in-
stances, the Court has found an agency action to be arbitrary.133  
Agency action is arbitrary when an agency offers “insufficient reasons 
for treating similar situations differently.”134  Applying the standard 
set in Volpe, a searching and careful inquiry into the facts reveals that 
the MSM ban is facially irrational.  As explained above, the FDA pro-
vides no rational reasoning for why MSM blood is barred for a life-
time deferral, yet, heterosexual donors engaged in similarly high-risk, 
or riskier behavior, are only deferred one year, if at all.  “[O]nly [in] 
the most extreme cases do antibodies manifest later than six months 
following transmission,” regardless of sexual orientation or sexual 
practice.135  Indeed, “all testing is prone to error, human and other-
 
129 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). 
130 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 532 (1985) 
(finding that courts afford agencies’ “findings of fact great deference” under the mini-
mum rationality or rational basis test). 
131 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 
CASES AND MATERIALS 868–92 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing judicial review of science-based 
decisions); see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When 
examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a 
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. 
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (“[W]hen resolution of that question de-
pends on ‘engineering and scientific’ considerations, we recognize the relevant agency’s 
technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is without substantial 
basis in fact.”); Browning-Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 
1990) (“Courts should be particularly reluctant to second-guess agency choices involving 
scientific disputes that are in the agency’s province of expertise.”). 
132 See Pub. Citizen v. Barshefsky, 939 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1996) (“The APA requires the 
court to set aside agency actions that are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006))). 
133 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
has . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an expla-
nation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so im-
plausible that it could not be ascribed to . . . the product of agency expertise.”). 
134 See Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
135 Boso, supra note 24, at 863. 
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wise, but” the FDA does not provide facts that suggest that the rate of 
error diminishes after a year for heterosexual donors, but not for gay 
men.136  Thus, the FDA’s MSM ban treats similar situations different-
ly,137 and it is irrational in light of the FDA’s interest in protecting 
public health.  “Under these rules, a heterosexual man who had un-
protected sex with HIV-positive [female] prostitutes would be OK as a 
donor one year later, but a gay man in a monogamous, safe-sex rela-
tionship is not.”138  Such a distinction cannot be held to be rational. 
The distinction between MSMs and men who have sex with wom-
en, without more, is not rationally related to the prevention of dis-
ease transmission.  In Motor Vehicle, the Court reasoned that agency 
actions are irrational if the agency “fail[s]to consider an important aspect 
of the problem.”139  In this case, an important aspect of the problem is 
unquestionably the growing number of new HIV transmissions result-
ing from non-MSM activity, and that, of those diagnosed with HIV, 
almost half transmitted the disease through means other than MSM 
contact.140  Rather than focus on the unsafe nature of any sexual act 
performed by any sexually active person, the FDA focuses on the class 
of the parties engaged in sexual acts (gay men), and ignores the reali-
ty of disease transmission.  Accordingly, under Motor Vehicle, the 
FDA’s failure to consider this important health aspect renders its ac-
tion arbitrary and capricious.141 
 
136 Id. 
137 See Transactive Corp., 91 F.3d at 237 (“[A]gency action is arbitrary when the agency offered 
insufficient reasons for treating similar situations differently.”). 
138 See Boso, supra note 24, at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
139 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(emphasis added). 
140 See Centers for Disease Control, Diagnoses of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States and 
Dependent Areas, 2008, 20 HIV SURVEILLANCE REP., 7, 17–18 (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/surveillance/resources/reports/2008report (“Estimat[ing] rates 
of diagnoses of HIV infections among adults and adolescents, by sex and race/ethnicity” 
and showing the number of HIV diagnoses increased among male and female adults and 
adolescents exposed through heterosexual contact). 
141 See Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (finding an agency decision “arbitrary and capricious if 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its deci-
sion that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise”).  For deci-
sions holding as arbitrary agency action based on scientific determinations, see Association 
of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 632 F.3d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the EPA’s failure to 
act in light of the strong evidence indicating inadequacies in current plan arbitrary and 
capricious); Midwater Trawlers Cooperative v. Department of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720–21 
(9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that an agency decision was arbitrary where it was demon-
strated that the rule was a “product of pure political compromise, not reasoned scientific 
endeavor”); Estate of Aitken v. Shalala, 986 F. Supp. 57, 61–62, 64 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding 
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The APA challenge of the MSM policy is by no means a slam-
dunk.  Courts are very reluctant to overturn administrative agencies’ 
decisions generally,142 and even more so when those decisions involve 
scientific determinations.143  Here, however, is a case in which the 
agency decision that is arbitrary and capricious is not based upon 
conflicting scientific evidence nor differences in opinion about what 
constitutes high-risk conduct.  Indeed, there is no technical subject 
for the court to address.  Rather, the policy is arbitrary on its face be-
cause it treats all members of a class as though they are engaged in 
high-risk behavior, while ignoring those in that class who are not,144 
and those of other classes who are similarly engaged in high-risk be-
havior.  The FDA policy invents a distinction between MSM and hete-
rosexual donors that is scientifically untenable; a gay man does not 
contract AIDS by being gay, but by engaging in risky behavior, the 
same as heterosexuals.145  The FDA policy does nothing to address the 
risky heterosexual behavior, and, instead, treats all gay men as dange-
rously sexually active. 
V.  ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
As shown above, neither the constitutional equal protection ar-
guments, nor the APA arbitrary and capricious challenge, are guaran-
 
grounds for agency decision to be considered arbitrary where the explanation currently 
offered by HCFA for its decision ran counter to the evidence before the agency). 
142 See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that FDA’s 
“judgments as to what is required to ascertain the safety and efficacy of drugs fall squarely 
within the ambit of the FDA’s expertise and merit deference from us”); see also Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (declaring ruling by Tenth Circuit an unauthorized 
“policy choice,” and explaining that “[t]he court should not supplant the agency’s find-
ings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evi-
dence”); Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that although plaintiff’s 
arguments were “sound and cogent,” and the Court itself “might not have chosen the 
FDA’s course had it been [theirs] to chart,” the APA precludes courts for substituting 
their judgment for that of an agency). 
143 See NRDC v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 552  (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“In the face of conflicting evi-
dence at the frontiers of science, courts’ deference to expert determinations should be at 
its greatest.”) (quoting Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1404 (4th Cir. 
1993) (holding where record supported both water quality standard urged by plain-
tiffs and one chosen by EPA, “the best course of action is to leave this debate to the world 
of science to ultimately be resolved by those with specialized training in this field”). 
144 And, sadly, even persons who are not gay, but appear to be gay, making blood bank 
nurses the sexual-orientation police.  See Roth, supra note 22. 
145 See Naomi G. Goldberg & Gary J. Gates, Effects of Lifting the Blood Donation Ban on Men Who 
Have Sex with Men, 5 PITTSBURGH. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 49, 57 (2011) (“If the cur-
rent MSM ban were completely lifted, we estimate that an additional 130,150 men would 
likely donate 219,200 additional pints of blood each year.”). 
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teed to persuade a court to overturn this discriminatory MSM policy.  
A third approach, however, may hold promise.  This Part suggests 
that the FDA, as an administrative body, has a role in determining 
whether its own policies are constitutional, and, therefore, could be 
persuaded to change the MSM policy, not based upon scientific evi-
dence, but rather based upon its understanding of what the Equal 
Protection Clause requires; namely, that gay men, as a class, be 
treated equally to other similarly situated donors. 
This Part seeks to expand upon arguments proposed by Gillian 
Metzger146 and apply them to the role the FDA plays in constitutional 
decision-making.  She explains, “constitutional law and ordinary ad-
ministrative law are inextricably linked:  Statutory and regulatory 
measures are created to address constitutional requirements . . . and 
agencies are encouraged to take constitutional concerns seriously in 
their decisionmaking.”147  The indeterminacy of constitutional mean-
ings opens a wide door for agency interpretation.148  Because of this, 
agencies continually consider constitutional boundaries in making 
their policy.149  Agencies are uniquely accountable and accessible to 
the public, and therefore may better reflect constitutional norms of 
the community.150  Indeed, constitutional questions such as whether 
gay men should be a protected class can be decided at the agency 
level,151 and possibly should be decided by agencies.152 
 
146 Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 479 (2010). 
147 Id. at 484. 
148 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term:  Foreword:  Implementing the Consti-
tution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 58 (1997) (“[R]easonable citizens, lawyers, and judges differ 
widely about what methodology should be used to interpret the Constitution, about 
which substantive principles the Constitution embodies, and about how, in more practical 
terms, constitutional norms should be protected by doctrine.”). 
149 See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise:  Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the 
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (explaining that administrators orig-
inally interpreted the First Amendment and constitutionality of police power limitations 
on free speech); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Pow-
er:  Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564–75, 580–
600 (1990) (arguing that “phantom constitutional norms”—norms rooted in due process, 
equal protection, and the First Amendment, but fundamentally at odds with plenary 
power doctrine—underlie many immigration decisions). 
150 See generally Metzger, supra note 146, at 502 (“Congress and the President frequently im-
pose statutory and regulatory restrictions on administrative decisionmaking that reflect 
their desire for agencies to attend to constitutitional concerns.”). 
151 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:  
The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323–25 (2006) (arguing expansion of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to cover sex discrimination “was 
forged in the Equal Rights Amendment’s defeat”). 
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Agencies have been called upon to determine the scope of the 
Equal Protection Clause before,153 and should do so when their poli-
cies clearly animate concerns of class discrimination.  Arthur Caplan, 
former chair of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availa-
bility, said the MSM policy “doesn’t make any sense, except as a mat-
ter of discrimination, to exclude one risk group completely and let 
others sort of go with abandon, if you will.”154  Although new Advisory 
Committee members are sworn to “support and defend the constitu-
tion of the United States against all enemies; foreign and domestic,”155 
neither the minutes from the 2000 or 2006 meeting,156 nor the rec-
ommendations offered after the 2010 meeting,157 refer to the Consti-
tution at all.  Indeed, the committee was apprised of the constitution-
al issues presented by the discriminatory MSM policy.158  The 
Committee should be called upon to align its MSM policy with the 
constitutional mandates of the Equal Protection Clause.  Just as the 
Obama administration has decided that laws targeting the LGBT 
community should be under strict scrutiny,159 branches of the gov-
ernment other than the courts are at liberty to come to more expan-
sive readings of the Constitution.  The FDA, charged with maintain-
ing the public health, has an interest in securing its reputation as an 
agency dedicated to scientific conclusions rather than policies based 
on discriminatory stigma. 
 
152 See generally Metzger, supra note 146, at 486 (“Agencies are not only well positioned to en-
force constitutional norms effectively, but they are also better able than courts to deter-
mine how to incorporate constitutional concerns into a given regulatory scheme with the 
least distruption.”). 
153 Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:  Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 
1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (2010) (describing FCC rulemaking inter-
preting the scope of the Equal Protection Clause). 
154 Conan, supra note 17. 
155 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY:  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BLOOD 
SAFETY AND AVAILABILITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 3 (2007), availa-
ble at www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/advisorycommittee/minutes/may2007.pdf (“Dr. 
Bracey invited the new members to come to the fore and Dr. Agwunobi swore them in.”). 
156 See supra notes 63 and 64. 
157 See supra note 68. 
158 See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., A.C.L.U. Wash. Legislative Office & James Esseks, 
Dir., A.C.L.U. Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender & AIDS Project, to Jerry A. Holmberg, 
Advisory Comm. on Blood Safety & Availability (June 8, 2010), available at 
www.aclu.org/files/assets/fdabloodban_comments_20100610.pdf. 
159 See Press Release, supra note 93. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment is not intended to distract from or minimize the 
dangerous infection rates among MSM men.160  Indeed, this author 
believes that the alarming figures of HIV infection among gay men 
should serve to increase awareness among the gay community and 
spark public policy that serves to decrease the rates of new infections 
by increasing the availability and commonality of testing and treat-
ment.  Nonetheless, the FDA’s MSM policy is unconstitutional, arbi-
trary and capricious, and discriminatory against gay men in a way that 
should violate administrative understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  This Comment has sought to build upon the claims made by 
others so that this twenty-six year old ban may finally be lifted.  As a 
result, not only will the blood supply benefit, but also the stigma at-
tached to the blanket ban on gay men will no longer be legitimized. 
 
160 See Donald G. McNeil, New H.I.V. Cases Remain Steady Over a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2011, at A16 (explaining that the HIV epidemic “is still concentrated primarily in gay 
men”). 
